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
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**SRI LANKA: Uneasy Calm**

*Violence in Colombo has eased now that the government has toughened its stance toward the communal rioting.* [ ]

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Following a week of indecision, President Jayewardene's government has curbed most violence with an islandwide, two-day curfew and increased military presence in major cities. There is still isolated looting and arson in Tamil neighborhoods, however, reportedly involving troops. [ ]

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Prime Minister Premadasa has appealed for calm and has claimed the violence is the result of "outside influences." The government has outlawed the three major leftist parties, as well as separatist political parties. Communist sympathizers, known terrorists, and criminals have been arrested. [ ]

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India publicly repeated its position that the crisis is an internal affair, following Foreign Minister Rao's visit to Colombo on Friday. New Delhi has denied plans to intervene but claims to be ready to send emergency relief help for Sri Lanka's Tamil citizens. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, Colombo has called on Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the UK to be ready to send in peacekeeping forces if the need arises. [ ]

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**Comment:** The calm may not last. Jayewardene's government has yet to address several problems, including the care of over 73,000 Tamil refugees now housed in camps around the capital. [ ]

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The severe damage to Colombo's food distribution network may lead to food riots as well. The islandwide curfew was lifted today, presenting the security forces with their first test at maintaining peace. [ ]

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In the past Colombo has often raised the specter of foreign intervention as a means of building national unity and diverting public attention from internal problems. Although Soviet support for both Tamil and Sinhalese extremist groups has long been suspected, no compelling evidence of direct involvement is available. [ ]

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**USSR: Food Supplies Improve**

*Shortages in the USSR of many quality foods have eased this year, but not enough to permit relaxing of the informal rationing system for selected food items that has spread widely since 1980.* [ ]

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US Embassy surveys of private farm markets and state stores have shown increased supplies of most foodstuffs, as compared with last year. Meat production, for example, has risen substantially.

[ ] some of the regions that have experienced substantial food shortages since 1980 have rebounded somewhat. [ ]

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**Comment:** If meat production reaches the estimated level of 16.2 million tons and imports approach the high level of 1982, per capita consumption would reach a record high. The record harvests of fruit and vegetable crops in 1982 have kept supplies plentiful. Milk production also has increased, and most of the lost per capita consumption of the last two years may be regained. [ ]

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During the past three years, the leadership has increased imports to maintain per capita consumption of some products. Import data for this year suggest that Moscow intends to sustain but not increase the import levels of the recent past. [ ]

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Food-related worker unrest has declined since 1981. This is largely the result of increased special food distribution to industrial installations and other worksites. [ ]

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The improved food supply in 1983 should ease the frustration of those without this special access. It also will allow the leadership to postpone decisions on hikes in the costs of food, which would be a departure from a longstanding commitment to stable food prices. Earlier this year the regime had indicated that it was considering price increases. [ ]

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**CHINA-TAIWAN: Revival of Reunification Campaign**

*Beijing has mounted a new campaign on reunification with Taiwan but is showing no willingness to broaden earlier proposals.* [ ]

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The Chinese news agency reported on Friday recent comments made by Deng Xiaoping to a visiting US academician on reunification. The statements closely resemble the last authoritative Chinese proposal, issued in September 1981. [ ]

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Deng offered Taiwan the right to conduct its internal affairs as a special administrative region and to maintain separate armed forces. He also called for increased contacts and talks with Taipei between the ruling parties. [ ]

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Deng, however, said no foreign interference would be permitted. He also criticized US policies toward China as inconsistent. [ ]

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Taipei immediately rejected the proposals by noting Beijing's broken promises to Tibet before that region was reunified with China. [ ]

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**Comment:** Beijing apparently wanted to put its official position on the record quickly after Western news reports suggested it was prepared to make significant new concessions to Taipei. Deng's ruling out of foreign interference almost certainly precludes purchases of foreign arms. [ ]

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The renewed emphasis on reunification over the past month puts Deng's stamp of approval on this issue publicly for the first time. Beijing wants to increase the pressure on Taipei to show more flexibility on reunification. The Chinese also intend to demonstrate to the US their continuing adherence to the principle of "peaceful reunification," which they promised to pursue in their communique with the US last August. [ ]

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**CHINA-US: Textile Accord Concluded**

Initialing of an agreement by Chinese and US negotiators in Geneva ends a yearlong effort to renew the textile trade pact that expired last December. The agreement permits moderate growth in Chinese exports of textile products to the US, which amounted to about \$800 million last year. The five-year agreement places strict controls on 33 categories and provides a mechanism to negotiate further controls if Chinese exports threaten to disrupt US markets.

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**Comment:** Resolution of the textile issue removes political obstacles to Chinese purchases of US grain, which Beijing has prohibited since Washington imposed restraints on textile trade in January. Preliminary details of the agreement suggest a moderation in the Chinese position, probably due in part to improved Sino-US relations but also to protect the earnings derived from textile exports. Beijing appears to have been strongly influenced by the US restraints—which started to cut into sales this summer—and the reluctance of US retailers to place Christmas orders that might later be embargoed. China also has been unable to sell enough textile products to other buyers to offset the reduced US purchases.

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25X1**PHILIPPINES: Church Criticism of Government**

A pastoral letter highly critical of President Marcos's policy on human rights will be read throughout the country on 14 August. The letter is a plea to abolish the Presidential Commitment Order, a legal device the government has used to arrest and indefinitely detain suspected subversives among Church workers, the media, and the political opposition. The Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, which drafted the letter, is dominated by conservative bishops who traditionally have been reluctant to speak out against the government.

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**Comment:** This will be the second pastoral letter attacking the government in six months, and it may portend a more active antigovernment role for the Church. The new letter will complicate Manila's efforts to resume a dialogue with Church leaders. During the past year, Church-state relations have been unusually strained over the human rights issue and over the Church's alleged involvement with Communist subversives.

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**POLAND: Interior Ministry Shakeup**

The recently announced reassignment of First Deputy Minister of Interior Stachura as the new Polish Ambassador to Romania reflects Premier Jaruzelski's continuing efforts to make the internal security ministry more responsive. [redacted]

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Legislation passed by parliament last month strengthened the ministry's central control over local police authorities. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Jaruzelski will use Stachura's sacking and the recent legislation to tighten his control over the internal security apparatus.

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[redacted] The action also may be intended to demonstrate determination by the regime to deal with some of those responsible for overzealousness by police during martial law. [redacted]

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**TANZANIA: Separatist Sentiment on Zanzibar**

[redacted] sentiment has become widespread on Zanzibar for abrogating the 19-year-old political union with the Tanzanian mainland, according to a fairly reliable source. Posters critical of President Nyerere began appearing on the island last month, and groups of Zanzibaris have been tearing down flags of the national political party. [redacted] Zanzibaris increasingly see themselves as little more than vassals of the mainland and also are angry over recent troop rotations in which mainland forces replaced some Zanzibari units on the island. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Secessionist sentiment has been growing for some time as Zanzibar's predominantly Muslim residents chafe under the political and economic domination of the largely non-Muslim mainlanders. A national party conference scheduled for this fall will consider proposals to modify Zanzibar's constitutional relationship with the mainland. If Zanzibari grievances are not satisfied at this meeting, the prospect of major violence will increase, and Nyerere could be faced with a choice between allowing the island to secede or using military force to put down separatists. Either course would further tarnish the reputation of the Tanzanian President, who already is under growing criticism for his failure to halt the country's economic decline. [redacted]

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
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**Key Iranian Leaders****Ayatollah Montazeri**

In his 60s . . . backed by "Line-of-the Imam" faction . . . selects Supreme Judicial Council candidates and names Revolutionary Court judges . . . supervises Revolutionary Guard ideological training and counterintelligence organization . . . close ties to Libya . . . health poor as a result of torture while imprisoned by the Shah.

**Ayatollah Meshkini**

In his 40s or 50s . . . backed by "Hojjatieh" faction . . . shares with Montazeri powers over judiciary delegated by Khomeini . . . Friday prayer leader in Qom and head of Qom Combatant Clerics' Association . . . head of Assembly of Experts.

**Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani**

In his 40s . . . formidable politician . . . founder and deputy head of Islamic Republic Party . . . Khomeini's representative on Supreme Defense Council . . . ties to Revolutionary Guard . . . hurt somewhat by crack-down on Tudeh, which he was willing to tolerate . . . rival of Khamenei . . . supports Montazeri.

**President Khamenei**

In his 40s . . . founder and head of Islamic Republic Party . . . chairman of Supreme Defense Council . . . ties to Revolutionary Guard and regular forces . . . leader of Friday prayers in Tehran, but has rarely spoken since seriously injured in bombing in June 1981 . . . rival of Rafsanjani . . . opposes Montazeri.

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## **Special Analysis**

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### **IRAN: Planning for the Succession**

*Ayatollah Khomeini has taken steps to ensure that his policies will continue after his retirement or death. The 83-year-old leader recently revealed the existence of a sealed "will" that probably calls for continuation of the war with Iraq and unrelenting hostility toward the US and the USSR. Khomeini also has intensified pressure on clerical factions to resolve their differences. Although disputes among the clerics are the greatest threat to their continued control, a rapid disintegration of the regime after Khomeini dies is unlikely.* [redacted]

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Khomeini's health apparently is stable, [redacted]  
[redacted] His involvement in the government's business probably will decrease, however, as he grows more frail. As Khomeini declines, the power struggle among the clerics is likely to intensify. [redacted]

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The Iranian leader and other influential clerics have already made some plans for the post-Khomeini era. The Ayatollah's 30-page "will," which is to be released after his death, probably is similar to a "last speech" he reportedly videotaped in June. [redacted]

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The Iranian exile media say that in the speech Khomeini calls for pursuing the war with Iraq until "final victory is gained in an all-out attack," recognizing that the US and USSR are both "satans," and strengthening the regime by choosing a single cleric to succeed him. After two years of delay, the clerical Assembly of Experts that will choose Khomeini's heir began meeting on 14 July. [redacted]

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### **Clerical Factions**

[redacted]

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The clerical factions are loosely organized, and their membership varies with the issues under discussion. One faction, the "Line-of-the-Imam," wants to institutionalize the concept of combining political and religious leadership in the hands of a supreme "guardian cleric" similar to Khomeini. [redacted]

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Parliamentary Speaker Rafsanjani, who probably is the country's second most powerful cleric, now supports this faction. Rafsanjani and the members of this faction are too junior to succeed Khomeini themselves, but they hope to preserve their power by installing a successor they can influence. They currently are backing Ayatollah Montazeri, regarded by many Iranians as Khomeini's choice as successor. [REDACTED]

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Montazeri is far less austere and intransigent than Khomeini. He supports continued war with Iraq and export of the revolution, is anti-Soviet, and has suggested that relations with the US are theoretically possible. No Iranian cleric will advocate actually opening contacts with the US, however, until the regime is certain of its ability to retain control. [REDACTED]

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The other main faction—labeled “Hojjatieh”—has the sympathy of the most senior ayatollahs, who have tried to disassociate themselves from the Khomeini regime, and of influential clerics at the seminary in Qom. This faction has been growing stronger over the past two years. It is now supported by President Khamenei, a bitter rival of Rafsanjani. [REDACTED]

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Supporters of Hojzatieh want a less autocratic regime with limited clerical involvement. They have sidetracked government proposals for major land reform and trade nationalization. The faction wants Western technology to rebuild Iran's economy, and it advocated the recent crackdown on the Tudeh Communist Party. [REDACTED]

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Hojzatieh, however, has little chance of supplanting Montazeri completely. Its succession strategy probably is aimed at obtaining a “leadership council” rather than a single successor, and then having its candidates chosen to rule with Montazeri. [REDACTED]

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The faction's leading candidate is Ayatollah Meshkini, who recently was elected head of the Assembly of Experts. He takes a hard line on the war with Iraq and is antileftist. [REDACTED]

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### **Prospects for Continuity**

At least initially, the clerics are likely to smooth over their differences in the interest of retaining power. Without Khomeini, however, they will have to rely more heavily on coercion of the populace. Even if the Assembly were to select Montazeri unanimously, he would not be able to evoke the same unquestioned obedience that Khomeini can command from the average citizens who are the mainstay of the regime. [REDACTED]

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A power struggle among the clerics probably would focus on the question of their role in government. Each group is likely to try to impose its view as the authoritative interpretation of Khomeini's legacy. [ ]

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Although the groups probably would prefer to reach agreement through compromise, disgruntled clerics with ties to armed elements could provoke violence that would eventually threaten the regime's control. The Iranian press acknowledged in mid-June that supporters of the two main factions had clashed in Tehran. [ ]

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If Khomeini died suddenly, the senior clerics who head the Assembly of Experts would take the lead in ensuring policy continuity and a smooth transition. The foreign policy views of Montazeri and Meshkini suggest that Iran would remain at war with Iraq, and that relations with the USSR would remain cool. [ ]

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In Khomeini's absence, Rafsanjani, Khamenei, and other, more junior clerics would be able to argue more effectively for ending the war in the interest of economic recovery and consolidating clerical rule. Rafsanjani also might try to justify improving ties with the USSR as a balance to anticipated increased economic relations with the West. [ ]

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Whichever faction wins, the regime seems certain to remain highly ideological. The clerics will continue to pursue policies and activities identified with their Islamic revolution and with Iran's economic needs and interests. As a result, any rapid movement toward political moderation in Iran would be unlikely. [ ]

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